This book focuses
attention on the hostility held by the ‘black shoe’ battleship admirals during
the 1930s and 1940s for the upstart ‘brown shoe’ officers of carrier aviation
who fought for recognition of naval air power before WW ll. The title alone was
a challenge to the aviation community, and it is difficult for me to understand
why anyone would want to revive the old animosities.
In effect the book would shift responsibility for all the chaos and sacrifices our Navy suffered in the Battle of Midway from the ‘black shoe’ battleship Admiral Fletcher who commanded our Task Forces to the ‘brown shoe’ aviation contingent.
"...
Fletcher, a trusted flag officer who nevertheless totally lacked naval aviation
experience, stepped into carrier command that afforded him an extraordinary
opportunity to be among the first U.S. admirals to fight a new form of naval
war."
Black Shoe Carrier
Admiral,
Page 3.
On-the-job
training! Admiral Fletcher had played no significant role in the Fleet Problems
of the 1930s where the role of carriers was really introduced and perfected year after year as aircraft performance improved.
Mr.
Lundstrom completely ignores the fact that our carrier operations and task force
tactics were really pioneered by Admirals like Reeves, King, Towers, Mitscher,
Bellinger, Davis and Halsey. He does not recognize the ‘brown shoe’ pilots who
risked and lost their lives during decades of these warlike exercises, experimenting
with the use of airplanes from ships, while
the ‘black shoe’ admirals practiced endless variations of War Plan Orange at the Naval War College, board games which called
for a decisive battle between American and Japanese surface forces in keeping
with the doctrines of Alfred Mahan.
As
early as the Fleet Problem X in 1929, and Fleet Problem XI in 1930, the
importance of getting in the first blow was proved. This was to be of major
importance in the 1942 plan to ambush the Japanese carriers as they were
attacking the islands of Midway.
“Of even greater consequence was that the
lesson of Fleet Problem X as to the importance of “getting in the first blow”
against enemy carriers was clearly reaffirmed in Fleet Problem XI.”
To
Train the Fleet for War, by Albert A. Nofi
However,
as the Battle of Midway opened Admiral Fletcher abandoned the aggressive first
strike ambush station 200 miles north of Midway in favor of defensive moves,
with nearly catastrophic results.
Still this 600 page book reaches the
unsupported conclusion that Admiral Fletcher was a pioneer of carrier aviation,
and glorifies his role in perfecting task force tactics. This when at Midway he had only
six months on the job, and in that time he lost the carriers Lexington and Yorktown, and almost
lost the Battle of Midway.
Three
months after the Battle of Midway Admiral Fletcher was relieved of sea going
duties and given command of the Navy’s Northwest Sea Frontier, based in
Seattle. History awarded the mantle of victory for the Midway battle to
Admirals Nimitz and Spruance. Little attention was paid to Admiral Fletcher
until this 2006 publication of Black Shoe
Carrier Admiral.
I
can sympathize with the intent of Mr. Lundstrom to salvage the reputation of a
worthy career officer like Admiral Fletcher, but not when he does so by
disparaging equally worthy ‘brown shoe’ shipmates.
At the Battle of
Midway, June 4, 1942, our navy planned to launch a surprise ambush attack on
the four aircraft carriers of the Japanese strike force. At dawn three American
carriers, Enterprise, Hornet and Yorktown would poise at a
point 200 miles north of Midway ready to pounce on the Japanese as their
aircraft were occupied attacking the islands. This plan was laid out to all
concerned on May 27th 1942.
PLANS FOR THE AMBUSH
In the evening of May 27, the CinCPac and task force staffs held a joint conference under
the direction of Admiral Draemel to hammer out battle plans. Present, among
others, were Admirals Fletcher and Spruance, Commander Layton, and the
operations officers: Captain McMorris from CinCPac, Commander William H.
Buracker from Task Force 16, and
Commander Walter G. Schindler from Task Force 17. The guiding principles were that the Americans, with inferior
forces but presumably better information concerning the opposition, must
achieve surprise, must get the jump on the enemy, and must catch the enemy
carriers in a vulnerable state. It was assumed that the Japanese Striking Force
would begin launching at dawn - attack planes southward toward Midway, search
planes north, east, and south. At that hour the American task forces, on course
southwest through the night, should be 200 miles
north of Midway, ready to launch on receiving the first report from U.S. search
planes of the location, course, and speed of the enemy. With good timing and
good luck they would catch the Japanese carriers with half their planes away
attacking Midway. With better timing and better luck they might catch the enemy
carriers while they were recovering the Midway attack group. That the Americans
might catch the Japanese carriers in the highly vulnerable state of rearming
and refueling the recovered planes was almost too much to hope for.
NIMITZ,
by E.B Potter, Pages 86-87
“After sundown Fletcher swung southwest
intending to be 200 miles north of Midway at dawn on 4 June, and again ready to
fight according to plan.”
Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, Page 239
Obviously
CinCPac Op- Plan 29-42, the operations plan that the author cites in his
defense of Admiral Fletcher, was ancient history as the day of the Battle
approached. The ‘calculated risk’ decision had been made… the United States
Navy was going ‘all in’. Once our carriers came within range to attack the
Japanese carriers they were necessarily exposed to Japanese counterattacks,
more so because the Japanese aircraft enjoyed longer ranges.
If
the first strike ambush attacks failed the three almost defenseless American carriers would have faced imminent retaliation from the most powerful and
experienced naval task force in the world. It was awareness of this that drove Annapolis trained
‘brown shoe’ officers like Lt. Commanders McClusky and Waldron to heroic
efforts to immobilize the flight decks of the Japanese carriers. It was “kill
or be killed” for the United States Navy.
It should be noted here that Admiral Fletcher abandoned the Ambush Station and initiated his defensive actions prior to the receipt of Ady's sighting report. The report of two carriers was not the reason for his caution.
Discovery of the Japanese carrier fleet came with radio reports from the PBY search plane of Lt. Howard Ady between 0503 and 0540 on June 4th. “…two carriers and main body ships bearing 320, course 135, speed 25, distance 180.”
“Meanwhile, weaving in and out of rain squalls in the area, Ady turned his Catalina around. There, through a break in the clouds, he saw an awe-inspiring sight, which gave him the sensation of “watching a curtain rise on the biggest show in our lives”. Below him was spread out, not all, but enough of the Nagumo Force to make the eyes of two young fliers pop.”
Miracle at Midway, by Gordon Prange, Page 190
a partial sighting.
(NIMITZ,
by E.B Potter, Page 93).
Mr. Lundstrom embraces the speculation that Fletcher believed that the Japanese had separated their four aircraft carriers into two separate task forces. The Battle of Midway chapters in this book are based entirely on the existence of two phantom Japanese carriers.
As the source for this belief Mr. Lundstrom gives Notes 31 and 59 referring to his earlier book, The First Team.
What he does not disclose is the original source of the information. The source for The First Team was the unsupported theory of Major Bowen Weisheit:
8. Students of Midway are greatly indebted to
Bowen P. Weisheit of the Ens. C. Markland Kelly, Jr. Foundation. A Marine
aviator in WW II, Weisheit set out a few years ago to learn as much as he could
about the Hornet Air Group in the Battle of Midway. His conclusions, based on
all available documents and lengthy personal interviews with key participants
present a totally new picture of the Hornet’s participation at Midway. Mr.
Weisheit most generously shared his research with the author.
Note 8, The First Team, by John Lundstrom.
So all of the Midway narrative created by Lundstrom to explain Admiral Fletcher’s actions on the morning of the battle requires the reader to accept Major Weisheit's research, which was conceived 60 years after the Battle, and runs counter to testimony by veterans of the battle, and to masses of recorded history from impeccable sources. The chapters in Black Shoe Carrier Admiral about Midway are not based on historical fact, but on the ruminations of one man with his own agenda, Major Weisheit, and an 88 page vanity press publication of the Kelly Foundation.
This questionable source is analyzed in detail in the blog below.
Mr. Lundstrom embellishes his version with so much authoritative detail supported by an impressive 80 pages of source notes that the reader is led to accept it as factual. In fact younger authors such a Jon Parshall and Craig Symonds seem to have already published accounts of the phantom two carriers as factual. This is an example of how doubtful material becomes embedded in history if repeated often enough.
Mr. Lundstrom also uses the phantom enemy task force to malign Cmdr. Stanhope Ring and Admiral Mitscher by asserting that they conspired without orders to dispatch the Hornet Air Group due west to search for the two phantom Japanese carriers, causing all the tragic events that followed, including the sacrifice of Torpedo Squadron 8 and the ditching of the entire squadron of VF-8 fighter planes. Is it conceivable that these two experienced career officers would have decided on their own to abandon the Midway ambush plan, and to divert our most powerful attack force to search westward for two phantom enemy carriers?
Below
is the May 31st signal from Admiral Nimitz to all task force commanders
confirming the composition of the Japanese task force, the Kido Butai. Full details of the Japanese attack plan were known to our
Navy’s commanders. As an experienced ship handler Admiral Fletcher would have
known that, with only twelve destroyers, Admiral Nagumo could not divide his
carriers into two separate task forces.
Prime Minister Churchill and eyewitness reports of Australian RAF pilots informed President Roosevelt that the Kido
Butai had employed the same composition of forces in a compact box formation of
5 carriers shielded by destroyers during the entire time they raided Ceylon, and trounced Allied forces in the Indian Ocean two months earlier. inconceivable that Nimitz and Fletcher would not have known that this was the case.
(Email from Peter
Smith, English Author)
For the December 7th attack on
Pearl Harbor the Japanese had all of their carriers included in one task force.
There would be no reason to change a successful tactic.
John
Lundstrom knew that Admiral Fletcher had all this information.
In
his own words:
“On 30 May after Task Force 17 sailed, CinCPac radioed the task
force commanders his latest and most detailed take on the composition of the
enemy forces. The Midway Striking Force comprised the familiar four formidable
carriers but the screen numbered only two fast battleships, two heavy cruisers
and twelve destroyers- a correct estimate.”
Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, Page 233
Still he and the Naval Institute would have us believe that Fletcher alone was ignorant of the composition of the Kido Butai and that he would he have been so concerned about the threat of two phantom carriers to his north that this was the reason he abandoned the ambush station 200 miles north of Midway? During his lifetime Admiral Fletcher himself never offered this as a reason for his action. However, 64 years later it was the best rationale a historian could suggest to explain his actions.
This
attempt to put a positive spin on a disastrous theory reminds me of the way
Edward S. Miller massaged events in his book, War Plan Orange, published a few years earlier.
The
author offers no explanation for Admiral Fletcher’s failure to employ the float
planes carried aboard his cruisers for the morning search. Instead of leaving the Enterprise and Hornet lying in wait to ambush the Japanese the admiral took all
three of his aircraft carriers eastward at high speed, using his SBD dive
bombers as scouts.
Everyone but Fletcher seemed to know that the
Japanese would be northwest of Midway that morning within striking distance to
launch and recover their attack aircraft. Pilots standing by in the
Enterprise ready room knew the names and plan of the attacking Japanese carriers,
according to dive bomber pilots Dusty Kleiss, Dick Best and others.
Even a Chicago Tribune reporter embarked on a cruiser had the details before the Battle and the details were published in the Tribune on June 7th, three days after the Battle. Included were highly classified messages providing the Japanese order of battle, and U.S. Naval Intelligence estimates of the Japanese battle plans.
All of the various attack groups based on the island of Midway navigated over the vast ocean to find the Japanese carriers without difficulty.
...more for full article email me |
Even a Chicago Tribune reporter embarked on a cruiser had the details before the Battle and the details were published in the Tribune on June 7th, three days after the Battle.
“The Tribune's scoop was crucial because of what savvy readers saw between its lines: Such detailed descriptions of Japan's plans, movements and even specific ships — the most important identified by name — had to mean the U.S. somehow had broken the Imperial Japanese Navy's secret code.” (Chicago Tribune Editorial
All of the various attack groups based on the island of Midway navigated over the vast ocean to find the Japanese carriers without difficulty.
At this point Spruance’s
Chief of Staff, Captain Miles Browning, must have been frantic. He had vast aircraft
carrier experience and he had been Admiral Halsey’s chief tactician. He
understood the importance of getting in the first carrier attacks, and he would
have been aware of the range limitations of our attack aircraft. He could see the planned ambush victory slipping away, and disaster looming. He is
reported to have had strained relations with Admiral Spruance that morning. No
wonder.
At 0700 the carriers Hornet and Enterprise launched
their planes at extreme range. Too far and two hours too late.
The Yorktown attack was launched at 0900, far east of the ambush station north of Midway and over two hours too late. Fortunately for Admiral Fletcher and the Yorktown pilots the Japanese carriers had changed to a northeast course at 0917, shortening the distance the Yorktown pilots had to fly to deliver their coordinated attack and return without exhausting their fuel.
Here again Admiral Fletcher demonstrated his cautious nature. Although late to strike, he still did not commit his full strength to the attack on the Japanese carriers. To defend the Yorktown he held back half of his dive bombers and fighters at the last minute without informing the strike leader Lt. Cmdr. Maxwell Leslie.
His timidity cost
Admiral Fletcher the opportunity to disable the carrier Hiryu in the
morning strike. Untouched, the Hiryu
was able to strike back and Fletcher lost his flagship carrier, the Yorktown.
“Under the impression that Lt. Wallace
Short’s VS-5 was nearby, Leslie radioed Short to hit the carrier to westward.
It was not until much later that he learned that VS-5 had been held back.”
Miracle at Midway, by Gordon Prange, Page 269.
By 1100 Fletcher, highly frustrated over not
having additional contact reports, sat on the seventeen VS-5 SBDs for nearly
two hours. As far as he knew Midway’s planes and the carrier strikes found only
the same two carriers, not the second group. The wait grew intolerable.
Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, Page 257
Mr. Lundstrom’s
narrative would have us believe that Admiral Fletcher was still waiting for the
appearance of the two phantom Japanese carriers, 4 hours after the Midway
aircraft had attacked the Kido Butai in
the morning, and an hour after his own Yorktown
squadron had destroyed the Soryu.
According to the
author’s narrative the Yorktown VS-5
dive bombing squadron sat there uselessly for three hours until the approach of
the Japanese dive bombers from the Hiryu
threatened the doomed Yorktown! He
does not explain why during this time the admiral did not use these planes or the cruisers' float planes to
search for his two phantom carriers. The author reports that he finally did again take
up the search for the imaginary two carriers at 1135, and cleared his decks of the fully loaded dive bombers. He writes:
The need to land the Yorktown strike group
assembling overhead, coupled with certain knowledge that the enemy found Task
Force 17, demanded Fletcher swiftly deploy the seventeen VS-5 SBDs held in
reserve the past three hours. As far as he knew the search and the several
land-based and carrier-based attack waves only found two of the four enemy
carriers… It was crucial to ferret out the second carrier group, now believed
to be north or northwest of the lead pair.
Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, Page 253
The ‘black shoe’
author makes no effort to explain what the phantom Japanese two-carrier task
force might have been doing from 0430 when Fletcher launched his first search
for them and this 1135 search. Fortunately this last search discovered the Hiryu closing in on the Yorktown, and planes from the Enterprise attacked, completing the
destruction of all four of the Japanese carriers by our ‘brown shoe’ dive
bombers. It was too late to save the Yorktown.
“Why
Fletcher did what, or didn't do, will always remain a mystery. Sure, many
official logs have been altered, held secret, or destroyed... but the truth
will someday evolve.”
CAPT N. J.
"Dusty" Kleiss, USN Ret.
(Email to Naval History, April, 2012)
“The plain facts are that the Yorktown was out of
effective range of Nagumo until after 0830 and that Fletcher attacked as soon
as he reasonably could.”
Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, Page 249
“Neither Fletcher nor Spruance were naval
aviators, they had not grown up in carrier-based squadrons or had command of an
aircraft carrier, where all the experience and knowledge is absorbed which
would qualify one to command a carrier task force.”
Lt. Cmdr.
Jimmy Thach,
Naval Institute Oral History
Without access to the
files still withheld by the Navy’s History and Heritage Command historians will continue to be tempted to speculate about
matters concerning the Battle of Midway as Mr. Lundstrom has done.
Certainly if there were anything in the
archives to absolve Admiral Fletcher it would have been publicized by now. Since
nothing has been released we can only assume the worst.
Admiral Fletcher was
a fine man; a patriot, talented, experienced and intelligent. It was not his
fault that he was given a job he was not equipped to handle. He gave it his
best.
As a loyal and
dedicated Navy officer he would have placed the welfare of the United States Navy
above himself. For this reason I do not believe he would have approved the publication
of this book by the United States Naval Institute; a die-hard pursuit of
intra-service rivalries of a generation past.
*****************
The summary above is
limited to the chapters of Black Shoe Carrier Admiral covering the Battle of
Midway. The book is also replete with defense of Admiral Fletcher’s decisions
in the Battles of Coral Sea, Savo, and Guadalcanal later in 1942.
Mr. Lundstrom is
forced to repeatedly defend Admiral Fletcher from criticism by Commodore
Richard Bates, who prepared The Bates
Report and Admiral Samuel Morison, editor of The History of United States Naval Operations of WW II.
Other worthies whose
criticisms of Fletcher are challenged by Mr. Lundstrom include Fleet Admiral
Earnest King; historians Fletcher Pratt, Edwin Potter and Samuel Griffith;
Admirals Robert Ghormley and Kelly Turner.
No one would object
to a sympathetic public relations account of the career of a distinguished naval
officer of Admiral Frank Fletcher’s repute, but when the Admiral is exalted
by unjustly disparaging a host of equally worthy officers of the Navy, Marines and Army it calls for a 'brown shoe' response.
The United States
Naval Institute has made every effort to glorify Admiral Fletcher, the black shoe admiral, rather than support
the recognition of Lt. Cmdr. Wade McClusky and other ‘brown shoe’ heroes who saved
the Battle of Midway for the ‘black shoe’ Admirals, Nimitz, Fletcher, and
Spruance.
****************
****************
Admiral Towers’ biography by Clark Reynolds was
published by the United States Naval Institute but is no longer offered for
sale by The Institute. Used copies are available from Amazon!!!
Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, the
biography of Admiral Frank Fletcher, was also published by The Naval Institute
and has been the most heavily promoted book ever published by the Naval
Institute. It is even being offered in paperback and as a Kindle eBook. In my
opinion the assumptions the author has made lay a false foundation for the
conclusions he has advocated. Why is this questionable book so favored by the
Institute while the Towers’ book is no longer offered for sale?
The subtitle of Admiral Towers’ biography tells the story…The
Struggle of Naval Aviation Supremacy. Admiral
Towers was a pioneer naval aviator who devoted his life to the procurement and
development of flying machines for the United States Navy, and adapting them to
the needs of the sea going fleet. His 'brown shoe' contributions to the US Navy
and to the victory at Midway are far more significant to students of history
than the questionable achievements of 'black shoe' Admiral Fletcher. His biography omits any discussion of his opinions about Fletcher's handling of our carriers during the Battle of Midway. A brief quote on Page 399 sums it up: "He ran away".
BELOW IS THE LINK TO:
Unanswered Questions about The Battle of
Midway:
August 1, 2013
Revised August, 2014